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Abstract:  This article estimates the effect of bundled residential park-
ing—parking whose price is included in the rent or purchase price of 
housing—on household vehicle ownership. Using data from the Amer-
ican Housing Survey, I show that the odds of households with bundled 
parking being vehicle-free are 50–75 percent lower than the odds of 
households without bundled parking, while households in dense center 
cities near transit are twice as likely to be without vehicles if they lack 
bundled parking. I also find substantial, though less stable, evidence 
that bundled parking encourages driving among commuters who have 
vehicles. These results are robust to a wide variety of demographic 
and land-use controls and to controls for residential self-selection. Ex-
amining self-selection shows that housing without bundled parking is 
sufficiently scarce and geographically concentrated that people who 
search for it may not find it. Four metropolitan areas, which hold 11 
percent of U.S. housing units, hold more than 40 percent of its hous-
ing without bundled parking. Overall, the results suggest that when 
cities require parking with residential development, they increase ve-
hicle ownership and use. 
Keywords: Parking, built environment, vehicle ownership, land use, travel
1 Introduction
Most Americans, when they buy or rent housing, also buy or rent at least one off-street parking space. 
They do so because the seller “bundles” the space with the housing—includes it in the housing’s price. 
This rather ordinary arrangement could strongly influence vehicle ownership and use. Because most 
cars are parked most of the time, and spend more time parked at home than anywhere else, bundling 
moves a large cost of vehicle ownership (the cost of storage) into the price of housing. Parking becomes 
an element of housing consumption rather than travel behavior, and an expense that should fall only 
on vehicle owners instead falls on all housing consumers, regardless of whether they own vehicles. By 
separating the cost of storing vehicles from the cost of owning them, bundling could make owning 
and operating vehicles seem less expensive than it actually is. Marginal vehicle owners—those wavering 
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about buying or keeping vehicles—are thus shielded from some of vehicle ownership’s costs, because 
they pay for parking in their housing price. Put another way, bundling reduces the opportunity cost of 
vehicle ownership; people who don’t own cars don’t save money on parking.  
It follows that people whose housing includes bundled parking might be more likely to own and 
use vehicles. One needn’t own a vehicle to use one, of course, but households with vehicles drive much 
more than households without them. In the 2009 National Household Travel Survey, respondents from 
households without vehicles drove an average of 3800 miles per year, while households with vehicles 
averaged 12,300 miles. 
This article uses the American Housing Survey (AHS) to estimate the relationship between bundled 
parking and vehicle ownership. To my knowledge, it is the first study to estimate this relationship us-
ing nationally representative data. I address self-selection using both instrumental variables and natural 
experiments that occur in subsamples of the AHS. My results suggest that bundled parking is strongly 
associated with vehicle ownership, and that this association is largely causal. People who might otherwise 
not own vehicles choose to do so when the cost of parking is hidden in the cost of their housing.
These findings have implications for both transportation and land-use policy. Bundling often re-
sults from minimum parking requirements in zoning codes; bundling is more common where parking 
requirements are higher (Manville, Beata, and Shoup 2013; Manville 2013). Parking requirements en-
courage bundling when they force developers to provide parking whose cost exceeds its market value, 
leaving developers little choice but to include spaces in the price of housing (Shoup 2005). My results 
therefore lend support to the growing case against minimum parking requirements. If parking require-
ments lead to bundling, and bundling increases vehicle ownership and use, then municipal efforts to 
fight congestion through parking requirements will be ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. 
The results also suggest that efforts to remove parking requirements needn’t exacerbate local congestion. 
Neighbors often support parking requirements because they believe buildings without off-street parking 
will still attract many residents with vehicles, who will compete for scarce street parking. An opponent 
of parking reform in Boston, for example, told the Boston Globe, “The city is asking us to believe that the 
people moving into the neighborhood [won’t] own cars, and we’re just not seeing that” (Ross 2013). But 
if units without bundled parking are more likely to house people without vehicles, concerns about curb 
spillover may be overstated, and the local costs of parking reform may be lower than opponents believe. 
The article’s next section reviews existing research about transportation and the built environment 
and the role parking might play in that relationship. Section III describes the AHS, Section IV presents 
the analysis, and Section V provides the conclusions.
2 Parking, vehicle ownership and the built environment
This article contributes to the relatively small research literature on vehicle ownership, the larger lit-
erature on travel and the built environment, and the growing literature on how parking influences 
travel choices. Studies of travel and the built environment generally characterize various land uses as 
cumulatively increasing or decreasing the price of particular travel modes, usually by changing the time 
or stress involved in completing a trip (Boarnet 2011). For example, a dense area with many buildings 
and narrow streets can make driving slow and unpleasant (and thus more expensive), while making rail 
transit more efficient and walking safer and more interesting (and thus less expensive). Chatman (2010) 
suggests that the former is more important than the latter—built environments that increase driving’s 
price have larger travel impacts than those that reduce the price of other modes.
Studies examining travel and the built environment number in the hundreds, and most find that 
the built environment influences vehicle use. Most of these studies do not specifically examine the deci-
sion to own a vehicle but instead measure total travel by different modes. Those studies that do focus on 
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vehicle ownership are somewhat less conclusive, although all suggest that the built environment influ-
ences vehicle ownership (i.e., Zegras 2010; Chu 2002; Cao, Mokhtarian, and Handy 2007).
Few studies of travel and the built environment examine residential parking, or even parking more 
broadly. Boarnet and Crane’s (2001) influential book on travel and the built environment mentions 
parking only in a footnote. Residential parking goes unmentioned in Handy’s (2005) review of the 
transportation and land-use literature and in Bento et al.’s (2005) study of travel behavior and urban 
spatial structure. Salon’s (2009) examination of travel and the built environment in New York does not 
analyze parking but calls it a “missing link” that might bias the study’s results through its absence. Cer-
vero and Ewing’s (2010) meta-analysis of travel and land use examined 200 published and unpublished 
studies, almost none of which included residential parking. Boarnet’s (2011) review and synthesis of the 
travel and built-environment literature does not mention parking at all.
Scholars neglect parking largely because parking data are scarce. The US government extensively 
tracks roads and vehicles but not parking spaces. Most local governments also do not collect parking 
data, even though almost all require off-street parking with development. Some researchers have tried to 
count parking spaces using maps or satellite photos (Davis et al. 2010; McCahill and Garrick 2010; Guo 
2013a, 2013b; Weinberger 2012), but in the dense areas where parking is most expensive—and thus 
most likely to shape travel decisions—many spaces are hidden in structures or underground. 
While parking’s absence from many studies is understandable, it is not trivial. Parking is a large 
part of the built environment, and easily the largest part devoted explicitly (and often exclusively) to 
automobiles (Manville and Shoup 2005; Chester, Horvath, and Madanat 2010). Further, the supply of 
off-street parking is also the most dynamic aspect of vehicular infrastructure. Because cities everywhere 
require new parking with new development, the parking supply increases with density, far more than 
the supply of road and freeway space.1 Not accounting for parking’s presence could therefore lead to bi-
ased estimates of other built environment attributes, like housing and population density. For example, 
suppose a developer constructs two identical 50-unit apartment buildings, one in the densest part of 
New York City and one in the densest part of Los Angeles. Each building holds 100 people. Los Ange-
les would require 63 parking spaces in this building, all reserved for residents, while New York would 
require none (Manville et al. 2013). Now assume (not unrealistically) that the Los Angeles building’s 
parking spaces are hidden underground and bundled with rent. The result would be two parcels with 
equal population and housing densities, which look identical from the street and the air, but which have 
very different prices for vehicle ownership and driving.
When researchers are able to assemble parking data, they generally find a strong relationship be-
tween residential parking availability, vehicle ownership, and vehicle use. Weinberger, Seaman, and 
Johnson (2009) studied two Brooklyn neighborhoods and found that on-site parking increased the like-
lihood of residents driving to work. Both the Weinberger (2012) and Guo (2013) studies of New York 
City yielded similar results. Chatman (2013) found that in northern New Jersey suburbs, on- and off-
street residential parking availability was the largest predictor of auto ownership and use, exerting more 
influence than density, transit availability, and other built-environment attributes. All these studies, 
however, are confined to a single city or metropolitan area, suggesting again the difficulty of assembling 
parking data. All are also in Greater New York, and three are in New York City, which is a transportation 
outlier in the United States. 
3 Data
The AHS is a panel survey of American housing units carried out every two years by the Census Bureau. 
The survey contains both a national sample weighted to represent all housing units in the country, and 
an embedded metropolitan sample weighted to represent a select number of metropolitan areas and 
1The supply of parking can also rise when development falls, as landowners demolish buildings and convert them to parking 
lots (e.g., Jakle and Scully 2004). 
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their primary central cities. The metropolitan sample varies with each AHS, with between six and 12 
different metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) examined in each round. This article analyzes household-
level data from the 2003 AHS (as I discuss later, I use some spatially aggregated metropolitan data from 
other years to build instrumental variables). I use the 2003 survey for two reasons. First, it precedes the 
economic downturn that began in 2008 and likely influenced vehicle ownership levels. Second and 
more important, the 2003 survey was the last to include representative subsamples of America’s largest 
MSAs: New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles (2009’s survey didn’t include LA).2 The 2003 survey also 
includes samples of northern New Jersey (Newark), Detroit, and Philadelphia.
Since 1983, the AHS has asked two questions about residential parking. The first asks whether 
a housing unit includes a garage or carport in its rent or purchase price. The second, which requires 
answering only when the answer to the first question is no, asks whether some other form of off-street 
parking is included in the rent or purchase price. I combine these responses into a single dichotomous 
variable coded 1 if the housing unit includes at least one parking space in the rent or purchase price. In 
all my regressions this is the independent variable of interest.
The AHS does not, unfortunately, specify how many parking spaces are included, only that there 
is at least one. It also does not specify whether the parking is on- or off-site. Further, a “zero” response 
indicates only that a housing unit lacks bundled parking; the survey does not differentiate between hous-
ing where off-street parking is available for a separate price, or where no off-street parking is offered at 
all. Thus “housing without bundled parking” represents both housing where off-street parking is sold 
separately and housing without off-street parking. The “treatment” I examine is not the presence of off-
street parking but whether that parking is included in the housing’s price.
The AHS shows that bundled parking is common and has been for some time. Figure 2, drawn 
from the 1985-2009 AHS national samples, shows that over 90 percent of US housing units include 
bundled parking, and that housing without bundled parking is more common in center cities and the 
Northeast. 
Figure 1:  Share of occupied housing units with bundled parking, 1985–2009
Source: AHS national samples
2 Comparing data from the 2000 Census and the 2006–11 American Community Survey suggests that the nationwide inci-
dence of zero-vehicle households did not change much during that time: it was 10 percent in 2000 and 9 percent in 2006–11. 
There was, however, some variation within MSAs. Los Angeles’ share of households with zero vehicles stayed constant at 
roughly 10 percent, but New York’s rose from 30 percent to 40 percent. 
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The AHS also asks about vehicle ownership, and I build a dichotomous variable coded 1 when a 
household has no vehicles, which I use as the dependent variable in most of my regressions. I also create 
variables that measure the number of vehicles per person in the household and the number of commut-
ers who drive to work, and I use these as dependent variables in additional regressions. 
These data alone suggest parking’s potential importance in influencing travel behavior. Figure 2 
combines data from the 2003-07 AHS metropolitan surveys and the Texas Transportation Institute 
(2011) to illustrate some simple relationships between bundled parking, density, vehicle ownership, and 
driving. The first panel plots the strong but not overwhelming negative relationship between population 
density and vehicle miles travelled (R2=0.3). Panel 2 shows the considerably stronger negative relation-
ship between population density and vehicle ownership (R2=0.7). Note that in both panels New York 
and Los Angeles stand out: in Panel 1, New York is the far lowest value on the regression line, while Los 
Angeles is an outlier; in Panel 2, Los Angeles has fewer zero-vehicle households than its density would 
predict, and New York has more. 
Panel 3, which plots the relationship between population density and the share of housing units 
with bundled parking, suggests an explanation for these anomalies. Most American MSAs have low 
population densities and high shares of bundled parking. New York, in contrast, is the only American 
MSA with high population density and a low share of bundled parking, while Los Angeles is the only 
American MSA with high population density and a high share of bundled parking. Bundled parking 
appears to explain more of the variance in driving than does density (Panel 4: R2=0.50), and more im-
portant, plotting bundled parking instead of density pulls Los Angeles back onto the regression line, 
suggesting that bundled parking could be an important intervening variable between density and vehicle 
travel. Lastly, Panel 5 shows the extremely strong relationship (R2 =0.91) between the share of bundled 
parking and vehicle ownership, with both New York and Los Angeles pulled back onto the regression 
line.
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Figure 2:  Bundled parking, population density, and vehicle ownership and use, US MSAs, 2003-07
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These relationships are of course bivariate and thus only suggestive; in my regressions, I control 
for an array of household characteristics predicting vehicle ownership. The most important of these 
is income. Because my dependent variable measures the probability of not owning a vehicle, in most 
regressions I use a dichotomous variable indicating poverty status rather than a linear variable measuring 
household income. I do so because owning no vehicle is likely a function of very low income. The total 
number of vehicles owned, in contrast, is likely to be a more linear function of income levels. 
The remaining controls include the number of people in the household, the household’s share 
of African-Americans (Giuiliano 2003), share of children under 18, share of foreign born (Chatman 
2014), share age 65 or older, and share with a college degree or higher. Almost every regression also in-
cludes dummy variables indicating central city location, transit proximity, and if the unit is in a structure 
built before 1920. This latter variable proxies for the overall availability of residential off-street parking. 
Developers began providing parking in the 1920s, and cities began instituting minimum parking re-
quirements in the 1930s (Shoup 2005). A pre-1920 building is also a crude proxy for a pre-automobile 
built environment (narrower streets, more intersections, etc.).
In later equations, I include variables that better capture different land-use and built-environment 
attributes. These variables control for the type of housing nearby, proximity to shops and offices, and 
so on. I do not use these variables in every specification because some have considerable nonresponse, 
making the sample size smaller. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for these measures. Like Figure 1, these statistics demonstrate 
the sheer prevalence of both bundled parking and vehicle ownership: over 90 percent of housing units 
include at least one parking space, and over 90 percent also have at least one vehicle. In contrast, only 55 
percent of units are near a transit stop. The simple correlation between bundled parking and being vehi-
cle-free is -0.29, which is twice the correlation between transit availability and being vehicle-free (0.14). 
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4 Analysis
Table 2 shows seven logit regressions examining the odds that a household will be vehicle-free. The 
first regression analyzes the entire AHS national sample, while the remaining six analyze the repre-
sentative subsamples of New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, northern New Jersey, Philadelphia, and 
Detroit. The national sample uses MSA fixed effects and is probability-weighted to represent the US 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for American Housing Survey Household-Level National Data, 2003
Freq. Percent of Total Total (N)
Housing Unit and Demographic Attributes
Housing Units With No Vehicles 4,135 8.6 48,197
Units with Bundled Parking 44,786 92.9 48,197
Units In Poverty 6,316 13.1 48,197
Units in Central Cities 14,194 29.5 48,197
Mean SD Min Max N
Proportion of HH with BA or Higher 0.21 0.34 0 1 48,197
Proportion of HH Males 0.47 0.31 0 1 48,197
Proportion of HH Children 0.17 0.25 0 1 48,197
Number of Children in HH 0.68 1.08 0 12 48,197
Proportion of HH Age 65 or Older 0.42 0.33 0 1 48,197
Proportion of HH Foreign Born
Proportion of Household Black 0.12 0.32 0         48,197
Total Household Vehicles 1.82 1.11 0 10 48,197
Vehicles Per Person 0.83 0.55 0 8 48,197
Persons in HH 2.55 1.45 1 16 48,197
Household Income $62,564 $147,483 -$10,000 $9,999,996 48,197
Year Structure Built 1963 25 1910 2003 48,197
Fraction of HH Commuters who Drive 0.87 0.29 1 1 33,572
Commuters in HH 1.60 0.71 1 8 33,572
Built Environment Attributes Freq. Percent of Total Total (N)
Public Transportation Nearby 26,362 54.7 48,197
Unit Within 15 Minutes of  Shops/Retail 30,341 76.2 39,830
Housing Unit Within 1/2 Block of:
     High-Rise Apartment Buildings (7+ Stories) 1,355 10.2 13,330
     Rowhouses or Townhouses 6,250 13.4 46,665
     Apartments 4-6 Stories 2,704 20.3 13,304
     Apartments Less then Four Stories 10,777 22.6 48,196
     Single Family Homes 38,014 81.0 47,758
     Businesses or Institutions 11,839 24.6 48,197
     Abandoned Buildings 2,225 5.0 44,160
     Industrial Uses 1,637 3.4 48,197
     Parking Lots 10,881 22.8 46,902
Source: American Housing Survey, 2003. Summary statistics are weighted to represent all housing units in United States.
Table 1:  Summary statistics for American Housing Survey household-level national data, 2003
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housing stock (Watson 2007). 
All the regressions show that households with bundled parking are much less likely to be vehicle-
free. Each regression includes, in its bottom rows, two interpretations. The first is the percent change 
in the odds a household will be vehicle-free if it changes from unbundled to bundled parking. In most 
specifications, the odds a household with bundled parking will be vehicle-free are 70 to 80 percent less 
than the odds a comparable household without bundled parking will be vehicle-free. In Philadelphia 
and Detroit, the odds are 63 and 54 percent lower, respectively. 
The second interpretation is a “probability shift” that uses the regression results to predict the 
probability that two stylized households will be vehicle-free. The first household is a non-poor, central 
city household near public transit that is “average” in every other way (i.e., all other variables are held at 
their means). This household does not have bundled parking. The second household is identical to the 
first, but does have bundled parking. The probability shift thus isolates the unique association between 
bundled parking and vehicle ownership. So, for example, a stylized household in central city New York, 
Newark, or Philadelphia without bundled parking is more than twice as likely to be vehicle-free as a 
similar household with bundled parking. In Los Angeles and Chicago households without bundled 
parking are over three times as likely as their counterparts to be vehicle-free. 
Table 2: Associations With Being Vehicle-Free, US  Households, 2003. Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
Bundled Parking -1.2178*** -1.3016*** -1.2103*** -1.6937*** -1.5790*** -0.9868*** -0.7681*  
(0.0598) (0.1333) (0.2283) (0.1735) (0.2690) (0.2066) (0.3388)   
Household in Poverty 1.5467*** 1.1701*** 1.5177*** 1.5342*** 1.3392*** 1.5508*** 1.8176***
(0.0464) (0.1677) (0.1475) (0.1696) (0.2764) (0.2029) (0.2348)   
Persons in Household -0.6342*** -0.4091*** -0.3793*** -0.3435*** -0.4527*** -0.5555*** -0.5593***
(0.0290) (0.0503) (0.0673) (0.0744) (0.1108) (0.0875) (0.1267)   
In Central City 0.4744*** 1.4333*** -0.0944 0.7418*** 0.8245** 1.1683*** 0.4287   
(0.0522) (0.1613) (0.1458) (0.1882) (0.2926) (0.2195) (0.3166)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -1.0535*** -0.4381** -1.1408*** -1.4154*** -1.5199*** -0.7239** -1.4288** 
(0.0676) (0.1563) (0.2482) (0.2364) (0.4139) (0.2771) (0.5020)   
Proportion HH Male -0.5848*** -0.5949*** -1.1601*** -0.8879*** -1.7426*** -0.5945* -0.3628   
(0.0635) (0.1722) (0.2269) (0.2182) (0.3656) (0.2509) (0.3097)   
Proportion HH Children 0.8153*** 0.1455 1.2008** -0.3379 0.7118 0.8064 0.4754   
(0.1185) (0.2997) (0.3657) (0.4341) (0.5876) (0.4624) (0.5405)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.6740*** -0.0226 1.1992*** 0.1140 0.5939 0.5698 0.6960   
(0.0753) (0.1570) (0.1775) (0.2416) (0.3106) (0.4084) (0.5381)   
Proportion HH Black 0.6416*** 0.4015** 0.7110** 0.7772*** 0.1848 0.6257** 0.4892   
(0.0557) (0.1456) (0.2180) (0.1740) (0.3071) (0.1947) (0.3173)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.6133*** 0.2617 1.0198*** 0.4860* 0.3486 0.2334 1.1541***
(0.0582) (0.1790) (0.2153) (0.2158) (0.3461) (0.2515) (0.3042)   
Year Structure Built -0.0058*** -0.0017 -0.0025 0.0014 -0.0067 -0.0046 0.0039   
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0054)   
Public Transportation Nearby 0.5455*** 0.8218*** 1.0086** 0.3421 0.7107* 0.6823* 0.6209*  
(0.0541) (0.2448) (0.3526) (0.2489) (0.3294) (0.2924) (0.2743)   
Constant 9.6676*** 2.7913 2.8590 -3.3700 12.7786 7.5828 -9.8941   
(1.9442) (4.9307) (6.7249) (6.4834) (9.8227) (7.7875) (10.7217)   
N 48,047 1,924 2,892 2,492 1,054 1,608 1,549
   N(No Vehicles) 4,136 768 278 305 135 235 114
   N(Bundled Parking) 44,637 1,002 2,729 2,088 854 1,257 1,470
Pseudo R-Squared 0.300 0.290 0.235 0.305 0.348 0.331 0.256   
Log Likelihood -21,670,000 -919 -700 -644 -263 -448 -303
Percent Change in Odds -70.4 -72.8 -70.2 -81.6 -79.4 -62.7 -53.6
Probability Shift 0.15 - 0.04 0.56 - 0.26 0.12- 0.03 0.23 - 0.06 0.25- 0.07 0.25 - 0.11 0.09-0.04
Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 includes MSA fixed effects and probability weights. HH = Household.
"Percent change in odds" is difference in the odds a household with bundled parking will have zero vehicles, compared to a household without bundled parking.
"Probability shift" shows the increased probability of a central city, nonpoor household near transit having vehicles if it includes bundled parking. All other 
independent variables are held at their means. Thus for the national model such a household without bundled parking would have a 15 percent chance of being vehicle-free,
while a comparable household with bundled parking would have only a 4 percent chance. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Ta l  :  ssociations with being vehicle-fre , US households, 2003—logit models
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To address the possibility that these relationships between bundled parking and vehicle ownership 
are artifacts of other land-use attributes, the regressions in Table 3 control for the nearby built environ-
ment. Most of the controls are dichotomous variables indicating whether a particular land-use type 
(high-rise apartments, single-family homes, shops) is within a half-block of the housing unit. These 
controls have two potential problems. First, because they only cover a half-block, they are imperfect 
proxies for a neighborhood’s built environment—a walkable mixed-use neighborhood could contain a 
half-block of detached single-family homes. In most instances, however, these variables probably give a 
reasonable sense of nearby land uses. Second, as mentioned earlier, some of these variables have substan-
tial nonresponse, so using all of them in a regression drops the national sample size from over 48,000 to 
just over 12,500. Using all of the variables in the MSA regressions would be even more costly and drive 
the sample size down to a few hundred. To preserve sample size in the MSA regressions, I remove the 
variables indicating the presence of apartment buildings, which have the most missing data. 
The land-use variables behave as expected, and not surprisingly when they are included the parking 
coefficients shrink. Households near high-rise apartments and shops and businesses are more likely to 
be vehicle-free, while housing units near detached single-family homes are less likely to be so. Yet even 
after accounting for these relationships, the association between bundled parking and vehicle ownership 
remains strong, except in the case of Detroit, where the coefficient stays negative but slips below con-
ventional levels of statistical significance. Effect sizes also do not change much: the odds that a housing 
unit with bundled parking will be vehicle-free are 60 to 80 percent lower than the odds a household 
without bundled parking will. Finally, the probability shifts associated with bundled parking also remain 
large. The stylized households in these probability shifts are similar to those in Table 2, but here I further 
assume these households are near apartment buildings, parks, and shops and businesses, but not near 
single-family homes, industrial uses, or abandoned buildings. In the national sample, such households 
are twice as likely to be vehicle-free if they do not have bundled parking, and between two and three 
times as likely in the MSA samples. 
Table 2: Associations With Being Vehicle-Free, US  Households, 2003. Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
Bundled Parking -1.2178*** -1.3016*** -1.2103*** -1.6937*** -1.5790*** -0.9868*** -0.7681*  
(0.0598) (0.1333) (0.2283) (0.1735) (0.2690) (0.2066) (0.3388)   
Household in Poverty 1.5467*** 1.1701*** 1.5177*** 1.5342*** 1.3392*** 1.5508*** 1.8176***
(0.0464) (0.1677) (0.1475) (0.1696) (0.2764) (0.2029) (0.2348)   
Persons in Household -0.6342*** -0.4091*** -0.3793*** -0.3435*** -0.4527*** -0.5555*** -0.5593***
(0.0290) (0.0503) (0.0673) (0.0744) (0.1108) (0.0875) (0.1267)   
In Central City 0.4744*** 1.4333*** -0.0944 0.7418*** 0.8245** 1.1683*** 0.4287   
(0.0522) (0.1613) (0.1458) (0.1882) (0.2926) (0.2195) (0.3166)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -1.0535*** -0.4381** -1.1408*** -1.4154*** -1.5199*** -0.7239** -1.4288** 
(0.0676) (0.1563) (0.2482) (0.2364) (0.4139) (0.2771) (0.5020)   
Proportion HH Male -0.5848*** -0.5949*** -1.1601*** -0.8879*** -1.7426*** -0.5945* -0.3628   
(0.0635) (0.1722) (0.2269) (0.2182) (0.3656) (0.2509) (0.3097)   
Proportion HH Children 0.8153*** 0.1455 1.2008** -0.3379 0.7118 0.8064 0.4754   
(0.1185) (0.2997) (0.3657) (0.4341) (0.5876) (0.4624) (0.5405)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.6740*** -0.0226 1.1992*** 0.1140 0.5939 0.5698 0.6960   
(0.0753) (0.1570) (0.1775) (0.2416) (0.3106) (0.4084) (0.5381)   
Proportion HH Black 0.6416*** 0.4015** 0.7110** 0.7772*** 0.1848 0.6257** 0.4892   
(0.0557) (0.1456) (0.2180) (0.1740) (0.3071) (0.1947) (0.3173)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.6133*** 0.2617 1.0198*** 0.4860* 0.3486 0.2334 1.1541***
(0.0582) (0.1790) (0.2153) (0.2158) (0.3461) (0.2515) (0.3042)   
Year Structure Built -0.0058*** -0.0017 -0.0025 0.0014 -0.0067 -0.0046 0.0039   
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0054)   
Public Transportation Nearby 0.5455*** 0.8218*** 1.0086** 0.3421 0.7107* 0.6823* 0.6209*  
(0.0541) (0.2448) (0.3526) (0.2489) (0.3294) (0.2924) (0.2743)   
Constant 9.6676*** 2.7913 2.8590 -3.3700 12.7786 7.5828 -9.8941   
(1.9442) (4.9307) (6.7249) (6.4834) (9.8227) (7.7875) (10.7217)   
N 48,047 1,924 2,892 2,492 1,054 1,608 1,549
   N(No Vehicles) 4,136 768 278 305 135 235 114
   N(Bundled Parking) 44,637 1,002 2,729 2,088 854 1,257 1,470
Pseudo R-Squared 0.300 0.290 0.235 0.305 0.348 0.331 0.256   
Log Likelihood -21,670,000 -919 -700 -644 -263 -448 -303
Percent Change in Odds -70.4 -72.8 -70.2 -81.6 -79.4 -62.7 -53.6
Probability Shift 0.15 - 0.04 0.56 - 0.26 0.12- 0.03 0.23 - 0.06 0.25- 0.07 0.25 - 0.11 0.09-0.04
Standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 includes MSA fixed effects and probability weights. HH = Household.
"Percent change in odds" is difference in the odds a household with bundled parking will have zero vehicles, compared to a household without bundled parking.
"Probability shift" shows the increased probability of a central city, nonpoor household near transit having vehicles if it includes bundled parking. All other 
independent variables are held at their means. Thus for the national model such a household without bundled parking would have a 15 percent chance of being vehicle-free,
while a comparable household with bundled parking would have only a 4 percent chance. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 2: Associations With Being Vehicle-Free, US  Households, 2003. Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
B ndled Parking -1.2178*** -1.3016 * -1.2103 ** -1.6937*** -1.5790*** -0.9868*** -0.7681*  
98 1333 2283 ( .1735) (0.2690) (0.2066) (0.3388)   
H usehold in Poverty 1.5467 1.1701*** 1.5177*** 1.5342*** 1.3392*** 1.5508*** 1. 176***
(0.0464) (0.1677) (0.1475) (0.1696) (0.2764) (0.2029) (0.2348)   
Persons in Household -0.6342*** -0.4091*** -0.3793*** -0.3435*** -0.4527*** -0.5555*** -0.5593***
(0.0290) (0.0503) (0.0673) (0.0744) (0.1108) (0.0875) (0.1267)   
In Central City 0.4744*** 1.4333*** -0.0944 0.7418*** 0.8245** 1.1683*** 0.4287   
(0.0522) (0.1613) (0.1458) (0.1882) (0.2926) (0.2195) (0.3166)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -1.0535*** -0.4381** -1.1408*** -1.4154*** -1.5199*** -0.7239** -1.4288** 
(0.0676) (0.1563) (0.2482) (0.2364) (0.4139) (0.2771) (0.5020)   
Propo tion HH Male -0.5848*** -0.5949*** -1.1601*** -0.8879*** -1.7426*** -0.5945* -0.3628   
(0.0635) (0.1722) (0.2269) (0.2182) (0.3656) (0.2509) (0.3097)   
Proportion HH Children 0.8153*** 0.1455 1.2008** -0.3379 0.7118 0.8064 0.4754   
(0.1185) (0.2997) (0.3657) (0.4341) (0.5876) (0.4624) (0.5405)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.6740*** -0.0226 1.1992*** 0.1140 0.5939 0.5698 0.6960   
(0.0753) (0.1570) (0.1775) (0.2416) (0.3106) (0.4084) (0.5381)   
Proportion HH Black 0.6416*** 0.4015** 0.7110** 0.7772*** 0.1848 0.6257** 0.4892   
(0.0557) (0.1456) (0.2180) (0.1740) (0.3071) (0.1947) (0.3173)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.6133*** 0.2617 1.0198*** 0.4860* 0.3486 0.2334 1.1541***
(0.0582) (0.1790) (0.2153) (0.2158) (0.3461) (0.2515) (0.3042)   
Year Structure Built -0.0058*** -0.0017 -0.0025 0.0014 -0.0067 -0.0046 0.0039   
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0054)   
Public Transportation Nearby 0.5455*** 0.8218*** 1.0086** 0.3421 0.7107* 0.6823* 0.6209*  
(0.0541) (0.2448) (0.3526) (0.2489) (0.3294) (0.2924) (0.2743)   
Constant 9.6676*** 2.7913 2.8590 -3.3700 12.7786 7.5828 -9.8941   
(1.9442) (4.9307) (6.7249) (6.4834) (9.8227) (7.7875) (10.7217)   
N 48,047 1,924 2,892 2,492 1,054 1,608 1,549
   N(No Vehicles) 4,136 768 278 305 135 235 114
   N(Bundled Parking) 44,637 1,002 2,729 2,088 854 1,257 1,470
Pseudo R-Squared 0.300 0.290 0.235 0.305 0.348 0.331 0.256   
Log Likelihood -21,670,000 -919 -700 -644 -263 -448 -303
Percent Change in Odds -70.4 -72.8 -70.2 -81.6 -79.4 -62.7 -53.6
Probability Shift 0.15 - 0.04 0.56 - 0.26 0.12- 0.03 0.23 - 0.06 0.25- 0.07 0.25 - 0.11 0.09-0.04
Standard errors in parenthes s. Model 1 incl des MSA fixed effects and probability weights. HH = Household.
"Percent change in odds" is difference in the odds a household with bundled parking will have zero vehicles, compared to a household without bundled parking.
"Probability shift" shows the increased probability of a central city, nonpoor household near transit having vehicles if it includes bundled parking. All other 
independent variables are held at their means. Thus for the national model such a household without bundled parking would have a 15 percent chance of being vehicle-free,
while a comparable household with bundled parking would have only a 4 percent chance. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 3: Associations With Being Vehicle-Free, US Households With Built Environment Attributes 2003. Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
Bundled Parking -0.8678*** -0.9756*** -0.9880*** -1.6539*** -1.5734*** -0.9505*** -0.5334   
(0.0862) (0.1576) (0.2509) (0.1838) (0.3305) (0.2342) (0.3811)   
Household in Poverty 1.5088*** 1.2035*** 1.6714*** 1.4950*** 1.3577*** 1.6155*** 1.7975***
(0.0716) (0.1910) (0.1614) (0.1837) (0.3193) (0.2199) (0.2602)   
Persons in Household -0.5077*** -0.4283*** -0.3807*** -0.3310*** -0.5509*** -0.5041*** -0.5089***
(0.0399) (0.0592) (0.0738) (0.0805) (0.1484) (0.0955) (0.1388)   
In Central City 0.4361*** 1.2054*** -0.1289 0.7499*** 0.4958 1.0827*** 0.4005   
(0.0761) (0.1869) (0.1605) (0.2035) (0.3582) (0.2592) (0.3445)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -0.9908*** -0.5988*** -0.9581*** -1.5051*** -1.3865** -0.5243 -1.4015** 
(0.0921) (0.1774) (0.2575) (0.2527) (0.4441) (0.2884) (0.5242)   
Proportion HH Male -0.3996*** -0.5147** -1.0807*** -0.9562*** -2.0863*** -0.6290* -0.3522   
(0.0881) (0.1936) (0.2448) (0.2338) (0.4402) (0.2679) (0.3341)   
Proportion HH Children 0.5473** 0.2126 1.0131* -0.2550 1.2584 0.5699 0.0954   
(0.1780) (0.3633) (0.4111) (0.4775) (0.7711) (0.5147) (0.6247)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.4975*** 0.0101 1.1882*** -0.0819 0.3067 0.6154 0.7110   
(0.1005) (0.1783) (0.1935) (0.2586) (0.3738) (0.4409) (0.6206)   
Proportion HH Black 0.4722*** 0.5787*** 0.4690 0.4893* 0.4314 0.5014* 0.3587   
(0.0795) (0.1684) (0.2474) (0.1954) (0.3557) (0.2174) (0.3390)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.7858*** 0.3786 1.1059*** 0.5124* 0.7136 0.2124 1.1444***
(0.0940) (0.2037) (0.2331) (0.2325) (0.3933) (0.2735) (0.3288)   
Year Structure Built -0.0050*** -0.0025 -0.0035 0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0028 0.0005   
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0043) (0.0061)   
Public Transportation Available 0.4254*** 0.9170** 1.4172** 0.6159* 0.1496 0.9855** 0.4914   
(0.1031) (0.3476) (0.4891) (0.3122) (0.3858) (0.3593) (0.3112)   
Unit Within 1/2 Block of:
Parking Lots 0.0890 0.0837 0.2436 -0.0534 0.3526 -0.0648 0.2359   
(0.0668) (0.1492) (0.1796) (0.1866) (0.3086) (0.2187) (0.2974)   
High-Rise Apartment Buildings 0.2357*                
(0.1044)                
Apartment Buildings <4 Stories -0.2362**                
(0.0860)                
Apartment Buildings 4-6 Stories 0.2399**                
(0.0832)                
Single Family Town- or Rowhouses -0.1604* 0.0800 -0.1906 0.1101 0.1588 -0.2661 -0.1051   
(0.0760) (0.1567) (0.2062) (0.1805) (0.3220) (0.2168) (0.3581)   
Detached Single Family Homes -0.3289*** -0.8178*** -0.3534 -0.5561** -0.6138 -0.0760 -0.7358*  
(0.0704) (0.1502) (0.1920) (0.1980) (0.3136) (0.2073) (0.3473)   
Shops and Businesses 0.3383*** 0.6026*** 0.4568** 0.6565*** 1.0434** 0.2896 0.6055*  
(0.0675) (0.1467) (0.1684) (0.1734) (0.3224) (0.2178) (0.2808)   
Industrial Buildings 0.1799 0.2572 -0.1315 0.2358 0.9057* 0.2671 0.3541   
(0.1116) (0.2417) (0.3077) (0.2737) (0.3997) (0.3221) (0.4114)   
Abandoned Buildings 0.1822 0.2205 0.6315* -0.1798 -0.5506 0.0575 0.8556*  
(0.1133) (0.3290) (0.3084) (0.2959) (0.5704) (0.2576) (0.3418)   
Constant 7.4102* 4.1662 4.2110 -2.2785 7.1030 3.6795 -3.1976   
(3.0471) (5.5903) (7.3923) (6.9946) (12.1361) (8.4173) (11.9589)   
N 12,619 1,670 2,662 2,356 933 1,484 1,422
   N(No Vehicles) 2,174 641 240 267 115 200 102
   N(Bundled Parking) 10,762 910 2,517 1,981 773 1,186 1,356
Pseudo R-Squared 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.28
Log Likelihood -8,593,000 -732 -598 -565 -201 -399 -264
Percent Change in Odds -58.0 -62.3 -62.8 -80.9 -79.3 -61.3 -41.3
Probability Shift 0.29-0.15 0.58-0.34 0.06-0.02 0.28-0.07 0.32-0.09 0.28-0.13 0.06-0.04
National model includes MSA fixed effects and is probability weighted. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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All these results are robust to a variety of perturbations. The national results remain largely un-
changed if I drop all observations from New York, and they do not change if I substitute household 
income for poverty status, or use dichotomous variables describing the demographic characteristics of 
the head of household rather than fractional variables describing all household members (e.g., use an 
indicator showing that the head of household is foreign born rather than a fraction of the household that 
is foreign born). Re-estimating the MSA regressions using every built-environment variable does not 
meaningfully change the results, though it greatly shrinks the sample sizes. Re-estimating the regressions 
with full land-use controls as Poisson models (with the dependent variable being the number of house-
hold vehicles) still yields a parking coefficient that is large, negative, and statistically significant. The 
national sample coefficients from these regressions suggest that a change from unbundled to bundled 
parking is associated with a 33 percent increase in the count of household vehicles.3 
In sum, bundled parking has a strong association with vehicle ownership. Does it have similar as-
sociations with vehicle use? The AHS’s only measure of vehicle use is commute mode—do commuters 
drive to work? Commuting is, on one hand, a poor proxy for overall vehicle use, since commuting is a 
small minority of both total driving and total travel. Commutes, however, are arguably of disproportion-
ate importance since they tend to occur at peak hours and contribute disproportionately to congestion.
Bundled parking might influence commute decisions in two ways. The first and most obvious path 
is through vehicle ownership; if households with bundled parking are more likely to own vehicles, then 
commuters in those households should be more likely to drive. Yet bundled parking might also encour-
3 All these specifications are available on request.
Table 3: Associations With Being Vehicle-Free, US Households With Built Environment Attributes 2003. Logit Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
Bundled Parking -0.8678*** -0.9756*** -0.9880*** -1.6539*** -1.5734*** -0.9505*** -0.5334   
(0.0862) (0.1576) (0.2509) (0.1838) (0.3305) (0.2342) (0.3811)   
Household in Poverty 1.5088*** 1.2035*** 1.6714*** 1.4950*** 1.3577*** 1.6155*** 1.7975***
(0.0716) (0.1910) (0.1614) (0.1837) (0.3193) (0.2199) (0.2602)   
Persons in Household -0.5077*** -0.4283*** -0.3807*** -0.3310*** -0.5509*** -0.5041*** -0.5089***
(0.0399) (0.0592) (0.0738) (0.0805) (0.1484) (0.0955) (0.1388)   
In Central City 0.4361*** 1.2054*** -0.1289 0.7499*** 0.4958 1.0827*** 0.4005   
(0.0761) (0.1869) (0.1605) (0.2035) (0.3582) (0.2592) (0.3445)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -0.9908*** -0.5988*** -0.9581*** -1.5051*** -1.3865** -0.5243 -1.4015** 
(0.0921) (0.1774) (0.2575) (0.2527) (0.4441) (0.2884) (0.5242)   
Proportion HH Male -0.3996*** -0.5147** -1.0807*** -0.9562*** -2.0863*** -0.6290* -0.3522   
(0.0881) (0.1936) (0.2448) (0.2338) (0.4402) (0.2679) (0.3341)   
Proportion HH Children 0.5473** 0.2126 1.0131* -0.2550 1.2584 0.5699 0.0954   
(0.1780) (0.3633) (0.4111) (0.4775) (0.7711) (0.5147) (0.6247)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.4975*** 0.0101 1.1882*** -0.0819 0.3067 0.6154 0.7110   
(0.1005) (0.1783) (0.1935) (0.2586) (0.3738) (0.4409) (0.6206)   
Proportion HH Black 0.4722*** 0.5787*** 0.4690 0.4893* 0.4314 0.5014* 0.3587   
(0.0795) (0.1684) (0.2474) (0.1954) (0.3557) (0.2174) (0.3390)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.7858*** 0.3786 1.1059*** 0.5124* 0.7136 0.2124 1.1444***
(0.0940) (0.2037) (0.2331) (0.2325) (0.3933) (0.2735) (0.3288)   
Year Structure Built -0.0050*** -0.0025 -0.0035 0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0028 0.0005   
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0043) (0.0061)   
Public Transportation Available 0.4254*** 0.9170** 1.4172** 0.6159* 0.1496 0.9855** 0.4914   
(0.1031) (0.3476) (0.4891) (0.3122) (0.3858) (0.3593) (0.3112)   
Unit Within 1/2 Block of:
Parking Lots 0.0890 0.0837 0.2436 -0.0534 0.3526 -0.0648 0.2359   
(0.0668) (0.1492) (0.1796) (0.1866) (0.3086) (0.2187) (0.2974)   
High-Rise Apartment Buildings 0.2357*                
(0.1044)                
Apartment Buildings <4 Stories -0.2362**                
(0.0860)                
Apartment Buildings 4-6 Stories 0.2399**                
(0.0832)                
Single Family Town- or Rowhouses -0.1604* 0.0800 -0.1906 0.1101 0.1588 -0.2661 -0.1051   
(0.0760) (0.1567) (0.2062) (0.1805) (0.3220) (0.2168) (0.3581)   
Detached Single Family Homes -0.3289*** -0.8178*** -0.3534 -0.5561** -0.6138 -0.0760 -0.7358*  
(0.0704) (0.1502) (0.1920) (0.1980) (0.3136) (0.2073) (0.3473)   
Shops and Businesses 0.3383*** 0.6026*** 0.4568** 0.6565*** 1.0434** 0.2896 0.6055*  
(0.0675) (0.1467) (0.1684) (0.1734) (0.3224) (0.2178) (0.2808)   
Industrial Buildings 0.1799 0.2572 -0.1315 0.2358 0.9057* 0.2671 0.3541   
(0.1116) (0.2417) (0.3077) (0.2737) (0.3997) (0.3221) (0.4114)   
Abandoned Buildings 0.1822 0.2205 0.6315* -0.1798 -0.5506 0.0575 0.8556*  
(0.1133) (0.3290) (0.3084) (0.2959) (0.5704) (0.2576) (0.3418)   
Constant 7.4102* 4.1662 4.2110 -2.2785 7.1030 3.6795 -3.1976   
(3.0471) (5.5903) (7.3923) (6.9946) (12.1361) (8.4173) (11.9589)   
N 12,619 1,670 2,662 2,356 933 1,484 1,422
   N(No Vehicles) 2,174 641 240 267 115 200 102
   N(Bundled Parking) 10,762 910 2,517 1,981 773 1,186 1,356
Pseudo R-Squared 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.28
Log Likelihood -8,593,000 -732 -598 -565 -201 -399 -264
Percent Change in Odds -58.0 -62.3 -62.8 -80.9 -79.3 -61.3 -41.3
Probability Shift 0.29-0.15 0.58-0.34 0.06-0.02 0.28-0.07 0.32-0.09 0.28-0.13 0.06-0.04
National model includes MSA fixed effects and is probability weighted. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
National New York Los Angeles Chicago Newark Philadelphia Detroit
Bundled Parking -0.8678*** -0.9756*** -0.9880*** -1.6539*** -1.5734*** -0.9505*** -0.5334   
(0.0862) (0.1576) (0.2509) (0.1838) (0.3305) (0.2342) (0.3811)   
Household in Poverty 1.5088*** 1.2035*** 1.6714*** 1.4950*** 1.3577*** 1.6155*** 1.7975***
(0.0716) (0.1910) (0.1614) (0.1837) (0.3193) (0.2199) (0.2602)   
Persons in Household -0.5077*** -0.4283*** -0.3807*** -0.3310*** -0.5509*** -0.5041*** -0.5089***
(0.0399) (0.0592) (0.0738) (0.0805) (0.1484) (0.0955) (0.1388)   
In Central City 0.4361*** 1.2054*** -0.1289 0.7499*** 0.4958 1.0827*** 0.4005   
(0.0761) (0.1869) (0.1605) (0.2035) (0.3582) (0.2592) (0.3445)   
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -0.9908*** -0.5988*** -0.9581*** -1.5051*** -1.3865** -0.5243 -1.4015** 
(0.0921) (0.1774) (0.2575) (0.2527) (0.4441) (0.2884) (0.5242)   
Proportion HH Male -0.3996*** -0.5147** -1.0807*** -0.9562*** -2.0863*** -0.6290* -0.3522   
(0.0881) (0.1936) (0.2448) (0.2338) (0.4402) (0.2679) (0.3341)   
Proportion HH Children 0.5473** 0.2126 1.0131* -0.2550 1.2584 0.5699 0.0954   
(0.1780) (0.3633) (0.4111) (0.4775) (0.7711) (0.5147) (0.6247)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.4975*** 0.0101 1.1882*** -0.0819 0.3067 0.6154 0.7110   
(0.1005) (0.1783) (0.1935) (0.2586) (0.3738) (0.4409) (0.6206)   
Proportion HH Black 0.4722*** 0.5787*** 0.4690 0.4893* 0.4314 0.5014* 0.3587   
(0.0795) (0.1684) (0.2474) (0.1954) (0.3557) (0.2174) (0.3390)   
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.7858*** 0.3786 1.1059*** 0.5124* 0.7136 0.2124 1.1444***
(0.0940) (0.2037) (0.2331) (0.2325) (0.3933) (0.2735) (0.3288)   
Year Structure Built -0.0050*** -0.0025 -0.0035 0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0028 0.0005   
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0043) (0.0061)   
Public Transportation Available 0.4254*** 0.9170** 1.4172** 0.6159* 0.1496 0.9855** 0.4914   
(0.1031) (0.3476) (0.4891) (0.3122) (0.3858) (0.3593) (0.3112)   
Unit Within 1/2 Block of:
Parking Lots 0.0890 0.0837 0.2436 -0.0534 0.3526 -0.0648 0.2359   
(0.0668) (0.1492) (0.1796) (0.1866) (0.3086) (0.2187) (0.2974)   
High-Rise Apartment Buildings 0.2357*                
(0.1044)                
Apartment Buildings <4 Stories -0.2362**                
(0.0860)                
Apartment Buildings 4-6 Stories 0.2399**                
(0.0832)                
Single Family Town- or Rowhouses -0.1604* 0.0800 -0.1906 0.1101 0.1588 -0.2661 -0.1051   
(0.0760) (0.1567) (0.2062) (0.1805) (0.3220) (0.2168) (0.3581)   
Detached Single Family Homes -0.3289*** -0.8178*** -0.3534 -0.5561** -0.6138 -0.0760 -0.7358*  
(0.0704) (0.1502) (0.1920) (0.1980) (0.3136) (0.2073) (0.3473)   
Shops and Businesses 0.3383*** 0.6026*** 0.4568** 0.6565*** 1.0434** 0.2896 0.6055*  
(0.0675) (0.1467) (0.1684) (0.1734) (0.3224) (0.2178) (0.2808)   
Industrial Buildings 0.1799 0.2572 -0.1315 0.2358 0.9057* 0.2671 0.3541   
(0.1116) (0.2417) (0.3077) (0.2737) (0.3997) (0.3221) (0.4114)   
Abandoned Buildings 0.1822 0.2205 0.6315* -0.1798 -0.5506 0.0575 0.8556*  
(0.1133) (0.3290) (0.3084) (0.2959) (0.5704) (0.2576) (0.3418)   
Constant 7.4102* 4.1662 4.2110 -2.2785 7.1030 3.6795 -3.1976   
(3.0471) (5.5903) (7.3923) (6.9946) (12.1361) (8.4173) (11.9589)   
N 12,619 1,670 2,662 2,356 933 1,484 1,422
   N(No Vehicles) 2,174 641 240 267 115 200 102
   N(Bundled Parking) 10,762 910 2,517 1,981 773 1,186 1,356
Pseudo R-Squared 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.28
Log Likelihood -8,593,000 -732 -598 -565 -201 -399 -264
Percent Change in Odds -58.0 -62.3 -62.8 -80.9 -79.3 -61.3 -41.3
Probability Shift 0.29-0.15 0.58-0.34 0.06-0.02 0.28-0.07 0.32-0.09 0.28-0.13 0.06-0.04
National model includes MSA fixed effects and is probability weighted. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3:  s ociations with being vehicle-free, US households with built environment atrributes 2003—logit models (continued)
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age driving over and above its influence on vehicle ownership; vehicle-owning commuters with bundled 
parking might be more likely to drive than vehicle-owning commuters without it. For example, if people 
without bundled parking must search for street spaces whenever they return home, driving becomes less 
convenient and alternative modes become more attractive. 
Table 4 shows the bundled parking coefficients from 24 regressions analyzing the commute deci-
sion to drive alone. While all the regressions include controls, to save space the table shows only the 
parking coefficients and their standard errors. For the nation and the six MSAs, I run four regressions 
apiece. The first two regressions are Poisson models analyzing the number of drivers in the household 
(with a control for the number of commuters) while the second two analyze the fraction of household 
commuters who drive. Because this fraction varies between zero and one and has a high mean (0.9), 
I estimate these regressions as generalized linear models with logit links, rather than as ordinary least 
squares (Papke and Woolridge 1996). (As I show later, however, estimating these regressions as ordinary 
least square models does not meaningfully change the results). The third and fourth sets of regressions 
are identical to the first two, but analyze only households with vehicles. 
Table 4:  Associations between bundled parking and driving to work, 2003—Poisson and generalized linear models (GLM)Table 4: ssociations B twee  Bundled P rking a d Driving to Work, 2003 - Poisson and Generalized inear Models
Location, Dependent Variable and 
Regression Form Coefficient Std Error N Coefficient Std Error N N(Unbundled)
National
   Poisson - Drivers 0.1763*** (0.0269) 9,036 0.0488* (0.0198) 8,124 796
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.5826*** (0.0792) 9,036 0.5016* (0.2028) 8,124 796
New York (52% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers 0.4494*** 0.1109 1,130 0.1992 (0.1143) 775 229
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.7833*** 0.1668 1,130 0.5016* (0.2028) 775 229
Los Angeles (94% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers 0.2061 0.2244 2,064 0.0303 (0.1070) 1,968 84
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.4514* 0.0814 2,064 -0.1474 (0.3039) 1,968 84
Chicago (83% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers 0.2353 0.0814 1,721 0.0868   (0.0830)   1,613 183
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.7631*** (0.1537) 1,721 0.2765 (0.1788) 1,613 183
Northern NJ (83% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers 0.3045* (0.1355) 650 0.2031 (0.1355) 602 80
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.9418*** (0.2525) 650 0.7606** (0.2774) 602 80
Philadelphia (77% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers 0.1251 (0.0992) 1,064 0.0543 (0.1007) 979 146
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive 0.6542** (0.2157) 1,064 0.5956* (0.2526) 979 146
Detroit (94% Bundled Parking)
   Poisson - Drivers -0.0459 (0.1512) 960 -0.0506 (0.1577) 936 31
   GLM -Fraction of Commuters Who Drive -1.0846 (1.0352) 960 -13.1105*** (0.3225)   936 31
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: National regressions include controls for: poverty status, transit availability, central city location,structure built before 1920,  share of household male,
share with a BA or higher, share under age 18, share foreign born, share black, and share 65 or older. Also proximity to parking lots, high and mid-rise apartments, 
parks, shops,single family homes, industrial uses and abandoned buildings. MSA regressions do not control for high- or mid-rise housing.
GLM regressions include robust standard errors, and are binomial family with logit links. Poisson regressions control for number of commuters in the household.
National regressions include MSA fixed effects and probability weights. N(Unbundled) shows number of households with vehicles that lack bundled parking. 
Bundled Parking - All Households Bundled Parking - HHs with Vehicles
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When analyzing all households, bundled parking has a strong and positive association with com-
muters’ decisions to drive. Much of this association, however, appears to result from bundled parking’s 
association with vehicle ownership. When the sample is restricted to households that own vehicles, 
bundled parking’s association with automobile commuting becomes more ambiguous. Although 12 
of the 14 coefficients are positive, only five are statistically significant (one Detroit coefficient, curi-
ously, is negative and statistically significant—perhaps because, as the far right column shows, almost all 
vehicle-owning households in Detroit have bundled parking). Some of the ambiguity may stem from 
omitted variables. Both the availability of parking at work and the availability of street parking at home 
will influence commuters’ decisions to drive, but the AHS has no metrics that capture these attributes. 
The regressions might also be confounded by self-selection. A household without bundled parking that 
nevertheless owns vehicles might be composed of people with a strong unobserved preference for driv-
ing, and my inability to measure this preference might result in parking coefficients that are biased 
downward (I discuss self-selection more below). In sum the evidence that bundled parking is associated 
with more drive commuting is suggestive, but not definitive.
4.1 Bundled parking and residential self-selection
The regressions above show a strong association between bundled parking and vehicle ownership, but 
cannot show whether that association arises from changes in housing consumption, changes in vehicle 
ownership preferences, or both. This is the residential self-selection problem: People who would oth-
erwise own vehicles might choose not to when confronted with the cost of unbundled parking, but 
housing without bundled parking might simply be more attractive to people who neither owned nor 
wanted vehicles to begin with. In the former case, unbundled parking would reduce overall vehicle 
ownership, while in the latter case it would only redistribute vehicle-free people toward housing that 
matches their preferences. In short, if travel preferences influence housing choices more than housing 
choices influence travel preferences, then the regressions will overestimate bundled parking’s impact on 
vehicle ownership.4
In general, three conditions must hold for residential self-selection to overestimate the built envi-
ronment’s impact on travel: self-selectors must search for housing based primarily on their travel prefer-
ences; they must find such housing; and, if they do not find such housing, they must not travel their 
preferred way—self-selectors, in other words, must be more sensitive to the built environment than 
others (Chatman 2009; Cao and Chatman 2013). Because these assumptions are strong, many studies 
that control for self-selection find that its impacts are real but modest, and in some instances, find that 
self-selection underestimates the built environment’s influence (Chatman 2009).
For the purposes of this article, the self-selection hypothesis assumes that people who do not want 
to own vehicles will a) search for housing without bundled parking, b) find that housing, and c) if they 
cannot find that housing, choose to own a vehicle. (If they did otherwise—chose not to own vehicles 
even after settling for housing with bundled parking—their actions would create an artificially positive 
correlation between being vehicle-free and having bundled parking, and thus underestimate bundled 
parking’s impact on vehicle ownership). 
These assumptions are difficult to examine directly. It is particularly hard to know why people 
choose their housing unit or neighborhood, absent surveys specifically designed to elicit this infor-
mation (e.g., Chatman 2009). The AHS asks a subsample of “recent movers”—people who changed 
housing in the previous two years—why they chose their neighborhood and home. Table 5 shows their 
answers. Contrary to the self-selection hypothesis, travel and parking preferences are generally absent 
from these responses. Respondents chose housing primarily for financial and design reasons, and while 
travel is implicitly important in neighborhood choice—respondents want proximity to jobs and ame-
4 For a general discussion of self-selection see van Wee (2009).
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nities—particular travel modes go largely unmentioned (the exception being the roughly 1 percent of 
respondents who chose their neighborhood primarily to be close to public transportation). 
These tabulations are not, of course, conclusive. People might still be searching for housing based 
on their travel preferences. The survey was not designed to identify transportation-based self-selection, 
and almost a fifth of respondents chose “other reason,” which might include preferences about parking 
or vehicle ownership. Further, people might search for housing that matches their travel preferences but 
not report doing so, because their travel preferences correlate closely with other search criteria. For ex-
ample, perhaps searching for a well-designed home convenient to one’s job almost automatically implies 
a home that meets one’s travel preferences. If so, the absence of travel modes from the responses may 
not be meaningful. 
At the same time, however, this sort of correlation between travel preferences and other desired 
amenities might be stronger for people who want to drive, because many desirable amenities may be cor-
related with environments designed around automobiles.5 For example, many people want newer, larger 
suburban housing, but housing without parking tends to be in older structures in center cities, so select-
ing on the desire for unbundled parking might involve sacrificing large homes, yards, and other subur-
ban amenities. Fischel (2002) argues that many suburban jurisdictions maintain quality public services 
by enforcing large minimum lot sizes, which simultaneously excludes lower-income people, increases 
minimum tax bills, and pushes land uses apart. One result is a strong correlation between good schools, 
low crime rates, and low-densities that encourage driving (Fischel 2002). The upshot is that people who 
want vehicles might face fewer tradeoffs in their housing search than people who prefer other modes. 
Assume for the moment, however, that people do prioritize bundled parking when they search 
for housing. The second condition of the self-selection hypothesis is that they find such housing. This 
condition is also difficult to meet; most housing in most parts of the country has bundled parking. Table 
6 uses data from the AHS metropolitan surveys, the 2000 Decennial Census, and the 2006 American 
Community Survey to show the scarcity and geographic unevenness of housing without bundled park-
ing. Unbundled parking is disproportionately located in older buildings of MSAs in the Northeast and 
Midwest. Chicago, Newark, New York and Philadelphia together account for 11 percent of the US pop-
ulation and housing stock, but 40 percent of its housing without bundled parking. The New York MSA 
alone holds 4 percent of America’s housing, but 24 percent of its housing without bundled parking. 
Table 5: Reported Reasons for Choosing Neighborhood and Home, Recent Movers 2003
Choice of Neighborhood Freq. Percent Choice of Home Freq. Percent
Convenience to Job 2,188 19.6 Financial Reasons 3,243 28.8
Close to Friends and Relatives 1,791 16 Design/Layout of Rooms 2,080 18.5
For Housing Unit 1,768 16 Other Reasons 1,959 17.4
For Aesthetics 1,710 15.3 For Size 1,567 13.9
Good Schools 749 6.7 Only Home Available 596 5.3
All Reasons Equal 306 2.7 Yard/Trees/View 548 4.9
Close to Leisure Activity 251 2.3 Quality of Construction 415 4.7
Close to Public Transportation 139 1.2 Exterior Appearance 415 3.7
Public Services 113 1 All Reasons Equal 401 3.6
Other Reason 2,272 20 For Kitchen 51.4 0.5
Total 11,287 101 11,275 101
Source: American Housing Survey, 2003. Columns sum to over 100 due to rounding.
5 People who don’t want vehicles might search for housing with parking because it increases property values, or because they 
want to use a garage as storage. In this case, the selection is uncorrelated with vehicle ownership preferences and might bias the 
association between bundled parking and vehicle ownership downward.
Table 5:  Reported reasons for choosing neighborhood and home, recent movers 2003
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Even these figures understate the difficulty of finding housing with unbundled parking. Most 
housing without bundled parking is in central cities, so consumers searching for suburban houses with-
out bundled parking are unlikely to be successful. Housing without bundled parking also tends to be 
old. Only 25 percent of Philadelphia’s housing predates 1940,6 but this one-quarter of units accounts 
for three-quarters of the region’s housing without bundled parking. In the Detroit MSA, all housing 
without bundled parking was built before 1940. In fact, anyone wanting new housing without bundled 
parking had best search in New York. In 2003, New York accounted for 1 percent of the nation’s housing 
built in the previous four years but an astonishing 77 percent of such housing without bundled park-
ing. In Los Angeles, Detroit, and Philadelphia, all surveyed units built from 1999 to 2003 had bundled 
parking. 
One might argue that this scarcity reflects consumer preferences—developers would supply hous-
ing without bundled parking if people wanted it, so its absence suggests that most housing consumers 
want parking with their units. But the ubiquity of minimum parking requirements undermines this rea-
soning; while the prevalence of bundled parking could reflect consumer preferences, it could also reflect 
government mandates. Housing might include parking not because consumers wanted it but because 
the government required it. Over 86 percent of America’s housing was built after 1939, and thus likely 
subject to parking requirements. It is surely no accident that New York, which has old housing stock and 
the country’s lowest parking requirements, also has the nation’s lowest share of bundled parking. And the 
history of minimum parking requirements suggests they arose because existing neighbors, not consum-
ers, wanted new development to have off-street parking (Shoup 2005). Bundled parking’s prevalence 
might therefore be as much a result of public fiat as it is of private choice.
4.2 Tests for self-selection
Bundled parking’s uneven distribution across metropolitan areas suggests a path to controlling for self-
selection: use MSA-level attributes that predict bundled parking as instrumental variables. This ap-
proach, similar to one employed by Brueckner and Largey (2008), assumes that while people might 
select houses based on their vehicle ownership preferences, most people are unlikely to select metropoli-
tan areas for that reason. For example, when people without vehicles or the desire to acquire them move 
to the New York MSA, they choose city apartments instead of suburban homes. But preferences about 
vehicle ownership are unlikely to determine whether people live in New York rather than Phoenix or 
Indianapolis. 
Is this assumption reasonable? The average American moves almost 12 times during his or her 
lifetime,7 but a large majority of these moves are within the same metropolitan area. In 2008, 37 per-
cent of American adults had never lived outside their hometowns, and 57 percent had never left their 
home state (Taylor et al. 2008). Between 1995 and 2000, only 30 percent of metropolitan residents 
6  Census summary file data do not predate 1940.
7 https://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/about/cal-mig-exp.html
Table 6: Availability of Housing Units Without Bundled Parking, Nation and Six Large Metropolitan Areas, 2003
US Chicago New York Los Angeles Detroit Newark Philadelphia
MSA Share of US Population n/a 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2%
MSA Share of US Housing Units (HUs) n/a 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2%
MSA Share of US HUs w/ Unbundled Parking n/a 6% 25% 2% 1% 4% 5%
Percent of Housing Units Built Before 1940 15% 22% 33% 14% 14% 21% 24%
Percent of  HUs w/out Bundled Parking Built Before 1940 23% 73% 24% 56% 100% 50% 74%
Percent of HUs 1999-2003 w/Unbundled Parking 2% 5% 40% 0% 0% 6% 0%
MSA Share of Housing Built 1999-2003 w/Unbundled Parking n/a 6% 77% 0% 0% 6% 0%
Sources: AHS microdata and summary data, national and metropolitan. American Community Survey, 2006 and US Census 2000.
Ta l  :  il ility of housing units without bundle  parking, ation and six large metropoli an areas, 2003
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who moved left their MSA, and in the 30 largest MSAs (a better approximation of the areas used in 
this analysis), the fraction is even lower: 26 percent.8 Thus during the time period I am analyzing, most 
Americans made housing choices that held their MSA constant. As for the minority of movers who en-
tered a new MSA, the existing evidence suggests that first, a sizeable share come from outside the United 
States, and second, those who switch MSAs within the United States do so for family or employment 
reasons (Schachter, Franklin, and Perry 2003). Exigencies of work and accidents of birth, not prefer-
ences about driving, appear to be the primary determinants of metropolitan location. 
This reasoning does not suggest that no one bases metropolitan location on travel preferences, only 
that most people don’t. And if most people don’t, then the MSA’s share of housing with bundled park-
ing will be correlated with the odds that any given housing unit in that MSA has bundled parking, but 
not correlated with anyone’s unobserved desire to own vehicles—therefore satisfying the conditions for 
valid instruments.
I use two instruments: the MSA’s share of housing with bundled parking, and its share of housing 
built before 1920. I construct these variables using summary data for the 2000-07 AHS metropolitan 
surveys. I use data from surveys before and after 2003, because the 2003 survey only has representative 
data for six MSAs. Using summary data from the surrounding years and then matching it to households 
in the 2003 survey allows me to use more than 30 MSAs and preserve sample size. Both variables sug-
gest the overall abundance of residential parking, and thus predict the chances that a given housing unit 
includes parking. Yet neither should independently predict a household’s vehicle ownership or decision 
to drive. Arguably the share of housing built before 1920 is unnecessary, as it is quite collinear with the 
share of housing without bundled parking (r=0.8). Nevertheless, I use two instruments, because doing 
so allows more accurate post-estimation tests. Instrumenting with the share of housing with bundled 
parking alone does not meaningfully change the regression results.
Table 7 shows two ordinary least square (OLS) regressions and two instrumental variables (IV) 
regressions. The regressions are linear, and the IV equations use two stage least squares, because IV 
estimation is extremely difficult when both the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor are 
dichotomous. In the first pair of regressions, the dependent variable is the number of vehicles per house-
hold. In the second pair, the dependent variable is the fraction of commuters in households with vehicles 
who choose to drive (similar to the second set of regressions in Table 4, but estimated as OLS rather than 
generalized linear models (GLM). The results suggest that much of bundled parking’s effect is causal, 
and that if anything, self-selection is underestimating bundled parking’s influence; the IV parameter 
estimates are consistently larger than the OLS estimates. More conservatively, the results suggest that 
at the least self-selection is not biasing the coefficients upward. Post-estimation tests show Wald scores 
substantially higher than the minimum Eigen values (this is so even when robust standard errors are 
used), offering some reassurance that the instruments are valid. (I show the first stage regression results 
in the Appendix).
8 See http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/migration/metxmet/
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Table 7: Associations with Vehicle Ownership and Driving, OLS and IV Estimates, 2003
OLS IV OLS IV
Bundled Parking 0.207*** 0.610*** 0.102*** 0.824***
(0.0167) (0.148)   (0.0151) (0.180)
Household Income ($1,000s) 0.000114 0.000361** -0.000106** -0.000450**
(0.0000810) (0.000130)   (0.0000398) (0.000148)
Central City -0.0447*** -0.0412*  -0.0251*** 0.00664
(0.00984) (0.0168)   (0.00700) (0.0152)
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher 0.154*** 0.170*** -0.0590*** -0.0302
(0.0145) (0.0218)   (0.0109) (0.0203)
Proportion HH Male 0.0984*** 0.102*** -0.00490 -0.00647
(0.0158) (0.0250)   (0.0107) (0.0215)
Proportion HH Children -0.719*** -0.732*** 0.0145 0.0212
(0.0205) (0.0323)   (0.0149) (0.0284)
Proportion HH Foreign Born -0.188*** -0.214*** -0.0202 -0.0376*
(0.0149) (0.0238)   (0.0113) (0.0187)
Proportion HH Black -0.0710*** -0.0368   0.0115 0.0134
(0.0132) (0.0215)   (0.00949) (0.0182)
Proportion HH Age 65 or More -0.248*** -0.262*** -0.0596*** -0.0852**
(0.0176) (0.0296)   (0.0157) (0.0306)
Year Structure Built 0.000429* -0.000693   0.000929*** -0.00120
(0.000213) (0.000637)   (0.000172) (0.000657)
Public Transit Available -0.0463*** -0.0868*** -0.0147 -0.0322*
(0.0114) (0.0234)   (0.00762) (0.0148)
Unit Within 1/2 Block of: -0.0280*** -0.0623***
     Parking Lots -0.0224* -0.0597*** (0.00815) (0.0160)
(0.0101) (0.0175)   
-0.105*** 0.00347
     High-Rise Apartment Buildings-0.0996*** -0.0194   (0.0210) (0.0374)
(0.0212) (0.0340)   
0.00562 0.0219
     Apartments <4 Stories 0.0186 0.0157   (0.00804) (0.0162)
(0.0103) (0.0181)   
0.0368* -0.0321
     Town Houses and Row Houses0.0342* -0.00143   (0.0160) (0.0257)
(0.0150) (0.0279)   
0.0160 -0.0151
     Single Family Homes 0.0874*** 0.0457*  (0.00858) (0.0178)
(0.0104) (0.0198)   
-0.00353 -0.0101
     Parks -0.000387 0.00292   (0.00821) (0.0152)
(0.00986) (0.0170)   
-0.0721*** -0.00999
     Apartments 4-6 Stories -0.0706*** -0.000942   (0.0130) (0.0246)
(0.0150) (0.0245)   
0.0109 -0.0280
     Industrial Buildings -0.0298 -0.0215   (0.0150) (0.0302)
(0.0191) (0.0382)   
-0.0152 0.0148
     Abandoned Buildings -0.0294 0.00444   (0.0165) (0.0379)
(0.0171) (0.0330)   
-0.0125 0.0335*
     Shops and Businesses -0.0503*** -0.00944   (0.00720) (0.0146)
(0.00998) (0.0163)   
Constant -0.119 1.781   -0.979** 2.623*
(0.418) (1.147)   (0.332) (1.156)
N 12,767 4,958   8124 3337
R-Squared 0.23 0.17 0.091 .
Dependent Variable Mean 0.70 0.72 0.87 0.87
First Stage Diagnostics
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.03
Minimum Eigenvalue 93 56
2SLS Nominal Wald 5% Test 19.93 19.93 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
OLS= Ordinary Least Square. IV = Instrumental variables (two-stage least squares).  Household bundled parking 
is instrumented with MSA share of housing with bundled parking, and MSA share of housing built before 1920. 
Regressions are probability-weighted, but some postestimation tests are estimated without weights in order
to generate eigen values. "Drivers per commuter" models only examine households with vehicles, and use 
robust standard errors.
Vehicles Per Person Drivers Per Commuter
Ta l  :  ssociations with vehicle ownership and driving, OLS and IV estimates, 2003
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One can quarrel with these estimates on a number of grounds. To use the IV regressions, I have 
drawn in data from other AHS surveys and changed the functional form of the regressions. Additionally, 
the share of housing built before 1920 might be correlated with aspects of the built environment other 
than the availability of parking (such as the width of streets) that might influence vehicle ownership 
decisions (although, again, estimating the regressions without this instrument does not change them, 
and in fact the bundled parking coefficient grows). Lastly, one might object, with some reason, that IV 
approaches are prone to enough problems to make them generally unpersuasive (for a discussion see 
Murray 2006).
To address these concerns, I carry out four further tests for self-selection. The first of these tests uses 
the recent mover subsample. To address the possibility I raised earlier—that some self-reported search 
criteria may be highly correlated with preferences about vehicle ownership—I estimate two regressions 
that include binary variables for every stated reason for choosing a neighborhood or home (Table 8, 
Models 1 and 2). The bundled parking coefficients remain large and statistically significant. In my 
second test, I restrict the sample to the roughly 5 percent of respondents who say their home was the 
only one available (Table 8, Model 3). Assuming this response is truthful, these respondents were not 
able to choose their home, which renders self-selection moot.9 Of these homes, 89 percent had bundled 
parking—essentially the same share as US households overall. The bundled parking coefficient is again 
robust, and the odds that households with bundled parking will be vehicle-free are 60 percent lower 
than the odds for households without bundled parking.
9 Over 30 percent of respondents who said no other homes were available were poor, suggesting that their choices may well 
have been highly constrained.
Table 7: Associations with Vehicle Ownership and Driving, OLS and IV Estimates, 2003
OLS IV OLS IV
Bundled Parking 0.207*** 0.610*** 0.102*** 0.824***
(0.0167) (0.148)   (0.0151) (0.180)
Household Income ($1,000s) 0.000114 0.000361** -0.000106** -0.000450**
(0.0000810) (0.000130)   (0.0000398) (0.000148)
Central City -0.0447*** -0.0412*  -0.0251*** 0.00664
(0.00984) (0.0168)   (0.00700) (0.0152)
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher 0.154*** 0.170*** -0.0590*** -0.0302
(0.0145) (0.0218)   (0.0109) (0.0203)
Proportion HH Male 0.0984*** 0.102*** -0.00490 -0.00647
(0.0158) (0.0250)   (0.0107) (0.0215)
Proportion HH Children -0.719*** -0.732*** 0.0145 0.0212
(0.0205) (0.0323)   (0.0149) (0.0284)
Proportion HH Foreign Born -0.188*** -0.214*** -0.0202 -0.0376*
(0.0149) (0.0238)   (0.0113) (0.0187)
Proportion HH Black -0.0710*** -0.0368   0.0115 0.0134
(0.0132) (0.0215)   (0.00949) (0.0182)
Proportion HH Age 65 or More -0.248*** -0.262*** -0.0596*** -0.0852**
(0.0176) (0.0296)   (0.0157) (0.0306)
Year Structure Built 0.000429* -0.000693   0.000929*** -0.00120
(0.000213) (0.000637)   (0.000172) (0.000657)
Public Transit Available -0.0463*** -0.0868*** -0.0147 -0.0322*
(0.0114) (0.0234)   (0.00762) (0.0148)
Unit Within 1/2 Block of: -0.0280*** -0.0623***
     Parking Lots -0.0224* -0.0597*** (0.00815) (0.0160)
(0.0101) (0.0175)   
-0.105*** 0.00347
     High-Rise Apartment Buildings-0.0996*** -0.0194   (0.0210) (0.0374)
(0.0212) (0.0340)   
0.00562 0.0219
     Apartments <4 Stories 0.0186 0.0157   (0.00804) (0.0162)
(0.0103) (0.0181)   
0.0368* -0.0321
     Town Houses and Row Houses0.0342* -0.00143   (0.0160) (0.0257)
(0.0150) (0.0279)   
0.0160 -0.0151
     Single Family Homes 0.0874*** 0.0457*  (0.00858) (0.0178)
(0.0104) (0.0198)   
-0.00353 -0.0101
     Parks -0.000387 0.00292   (0.00821) (0.0152)
(0.00986) (0.0170)   
-0.0721*** -0.00999
     Apartments 4-6 Stories -0.0706*** -0.000942   (0.0130) (0.0246)
(0.0150) (0.0245)   
0.0109 -0.0280
     Industrial Buildings -0.0298 -0.0215   (0.0150) (0.0302)
(0.0191) (0.0382)   
-0.0152 0.0148
     Abandoned Buildings -0.0294 0.00444   (0.0165) (0.0379)
(0.0171) (0.0330)   
-0.0125 0.0335*
     Shops and Businesses -0.0503*** -0.00944   (0.00720) (0.0146)
(0.00998) (0.0163)   
Constant -0.119 1.781   -0.979** 2.623*
(0.418) (1.147)   (0.332) (1.156)
N 12,767 4,958   8124 3337
R-Squared 0.23 0.17 0.091 .
Dependent Variable Mean 0.70 0.72 0.87 0.87
First Stage Diagnostics
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.03
Minimum Eigenvalue 93 56
2SLS Nominal Wald 5% Test 19.93 19.93 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
OLS= Ordinary Least Square. IV = Instrumental variables (two-stage least squares).  Household bundled parking 
is instrumented with MSA share of housing with bundled parking, and MSA share of housing built before 1920. 
Regressions are probability-weighted, but some postestimation tests are estimated without weights in order
to generate eigen values. "Drivers per commuter" models only examine households with vehicles, and use 
robust standard errors.
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Table 8: Associations with Vehicle Ownership, Recent Movers by Reasons for
for Choosing Home and Neighborhood, 2003 Proximity
Only Home (3)
Neighborhood Housing Unit Available
(1) (2) (4) -0.8335
(0.6343)
Bundled Parking -0.6649*** -0.6865*** -1.2719*  
(0.1505) (0.1483) (0.6482)   1.7179***
(0.5105)
Household in Poverty 1.5078*** 1.4763*** 1.6273***
(0.1141) (0.1130) (0.3917)   -0.7097**
(0.2370)
Persons in Household -0.3579*** -0.3559*** -0.4738*  
(0.0688) (0.0705) (0.2235)   0.0687
(0.4941)
In Central City 0.1763 0.1661 0.6003   
(0.1126) (0.1122) (0.4109)   -1.6005**
(0.5885)
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -0.7404* -1.1306*** -1.4233*  
(0.3763) (0.1595) (0.7047)   -0.9216
(0.5403)
Proportion HH Male -0.3078* -0.3104* -1.1289*  
(0.1448) (0.1436) (0.5322)   1.6603
(1.5529)
Proportion HH Children 0.2280 0.2265 1.1504   
(0.2969) (0.3035) (1.2032)   0.9759
(0.6834)
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.5028** 0.4671** 1.1272   
(0.1556) (0.1563) (0.5851)   -0.5748
(0.5465)
Proportion HH Black 0.6265*** 0.6348*** 1.0976*  
(0.1264) (0.1269) (0.4391)   -0.5074
(0.8051)
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.5516** 0.5350* -0.5414   
(0.2111) (0.2144) (0.6786)   -0.0088
(0.0129)
Year Structure Built -0.0110*** -0.0106*** -0.0192   
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0101)   
Public Transportation Available 0.4605** 0.5540*** 0.4192   
(0.1495) (0.1492) (0.4441)   19.0971 
 (25.3906)
Constant  20.2481*** 19.3691*** 40.1161*  
(4.8024)   (4.7146)  (19.8707) -75.6
Percent Change in Odds -49.7 -62.6 -60.5 139
0.243
N 4,730 4,726 303   -1.608e+05
   N(No Vehicles) 678 681 73
   N(Bundled Parking) 4,171 4,166 264
Pseudo R-Squared 0.255 0.247 0.348   
Log Likelihood -3,177,000 -3.222e+06 -2.374e+05   
Notes: Dependent variable coded 1 if household has no vehicles. Standard errors in parentheses. 
All models use CMSA fixed effects, plus dummy variables for six largest SMSAs.
 Models 1 and 2 weighted to represent all US housing units.  
All models include built environment characteristics included in earlier table. 
Model 1 controls for the following neighborhood selection criteria: close to job, close to friends, 
close to schools, close to leisure, close to public transportation, neighborhood design, house,  other.
Model 2 controls for the following housing selection criteria: financial reasons, room design, kitchen, 
size, external appearance, yard and trees, construction quality, only home available, other reason. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
All Reasons for Choosing
Table 8:  Associations with vehicle ownership, recent movers by reason for choosing home 
and neighborhood, 2003
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The third test for self-selection restricts the sample to rent-regulated housing in New York City (Ta-
ble 9). Rent-regulated units offer both lower prices and greater tenant rights (such as protections from 
eviction) than market-rate housing,10 and these submarket prices might misallocate housing by creating 
large penalties for moving. People reluctant to give up steeply discounted housing might keep units 
with some attributes they do not value, and not seek housing with attributes they value highly (Glaeser 
and Luttmer 2003). For instance, a couple with grown children might not downsize to a smaller apart-
ment if doing so requires exchanging their lower-priced regulated apartment for a smaller unregulated 
unit that costs more. Yet an observer unaware of the rent regulation might wrongly conclude that this 
couple strongly values extra space; the price control upsets the normal relationship between amenities 
and prices, and by selecting for price people in rent-regulated units might not be selecting along other 
desired amenities, including whether the unit includes parking. Some people who value parking highly 
might forego it to keep cheap rent, and vice-versa. 
The regressions show that the odds of unit with bundled parking being vehicle-free are about 70 
percent lower than the odds for housing without bundled parking. However, because the sample size is 
small, these rent-control regressions do not include full built-environment controls. Further, unlike all 
other samples in this article, rent-regulated units overwhelmingly do not have bundled parking—only 
10 percent include a parking space. Thus while the relationship between bundled parking and vehicle 
ownership remains robust and consistent in these equations, it may provide a less persuasive test for 
self-selection. 
10 See New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (2002).
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The final test for self-selection restricts the sample to public housing units. People cannot self-select 
if they cannot choose their own housing, and some US public housing authorities sort people into 
housing in procedures that, at least with respect to parking, give them no choices. With the help of a 
research assistant, I reviewed literature about tenant selection in public housing and contacted four large 
housing authorities (Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia) to ask both how they assigned 
their units and whether their units included parking. I found three common factors in these procedures: 
a quasi-random assignment procedure based primarily on the number of bedrooms; housing locations 
that prevent every unit from having bundled parking; and long waitlists that discourage people from 
turning down units they have been assigned. These factors in combination often make bundled parking 
Table 9: Associations with Being Vehicle-Free, Rent-Regulated
Households in New York City, 2003
(1) (2)
Bundled Parking -1.248* -1.282*
(0.519) (0.541)
Household in Poverty 0.659 0.568
(0.431) (0.441)
Persons in Household -0.354* -0.352*
(0.144) (0.151)
Proportion of HH Male -0.326 -0.422
(0.469) (0.490)
Proportion Children -0.630 -0.646
(0.848) (0.875)
Proportion Immigrant -0.333 -0.364
(0.439) (0.454)
Proportion Age 65 or Over 1.119* 0.995
(0.516) (0.523)
Unit Near Single Family Homes -0.870*
(0.372)




Percent Change in Odds -71.3 -72.3
N 194 189
   N(No Vehicles) 135 132
   N(Bundled Parking) 20 20
Pseudo R-Squared 0.123 0.153
Log Likelihood -104.5 -97.96
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 9:  Associations with being vehicle-free, rent-r gulated households 
in New Y rk C ty, 2003
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exogenous to housing choices.
The Los Angeles housing authority, for example, explains its unit assignment as follows (emphasis 
added):
Applicants will be provided up to three offers of units at three different sites. Offers are gener-
ated at random based on the vacancies ready for occupancy at the time of the offers. Appli-
cants do not get to pick their site.11
Only one public housing site in Los Angeles includes parking with each unit. Every other site has 
some parking but not enough for all units. Because applicants are assigned sites and units by chance, 
some receive housing without parking, regardless of whether they own or want vehicles. In most sites, 
residents must apply separately for parking permits, and when there are more applications than permits, 
the site holds a lottery. Tenants who don’t secure parking through the lottery must either find off-street 
parking elsewhere or (more likely) use spaces on the street. Philadelphia and Chicago have similar sys-
tems. In both cities, parking for public housing is first come, first served, meaning some residents get 
off-street spaces while others park on the street. 
Would-be drivers sorted into housing without parking could ask for different units or try to trans-
fer. But long waitlists discourage either option. Rejecting offers puts applicants back into queues, and 
public housing waitlists have long been at crisis levels. In 1999, the US Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) reported that the average wait time across housing authorities nation-
wide was 33 months, and in some cities much longer. New York City’s wait list was eight years, while 
Oakland’s was six, and Cleveland’s five. Los Angeles’ 2003 waitlist was three years (Curry 2004). Severe 
shortages were not unique to large cities; suburban housing authorities in Alabama and Minnesota also 
had long queues (Curry 2004). These conditions make transfers uncommon. Jacob (2004), after inter-
viewing Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) officials, reported that:
With roughly 30,000 families on the waiting list for CHA housing, waiting times of 7-8 
years for public housing...are not uncommon. When families reach the top of the list, they 
are assigned units based on bedroom size and availability. Prospective tenants can reject an 
offer and place their name on a waiting list for a particular development, but this rarely oc-
curs in practice because the site-specific waiting lists are often longer than the general CHA 
list. Because of the high demand for public housing services and the physical deterioration of 
many buildings, there are almost no transfers...”
Table 10 shows three regressions. The first equation examines all public housing units in the AHS. 
The second is restricted to public housing units in the four large MSAs whose central city procedures 
and backlogs I examined: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia (shortages in the central 
city often spill over into suburban public housing authorities). The third equation analyzes only the 
units in those central cities. In all equations, the coefficients on bundled parking remain large, negative, 
and statistically significant, and suggest that the odds of a household being vehicle-free are 60 to 75 
percent lower for housing units with bundled parking than without.
11 http://www.hacla.org/apply-public-housing/
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Table 10: Associations with Having Zero Vehicles,  Public Housing Households, 2003
(1) (2) (3)   
All 4 MSAs 4 CCs
               
Bundled Parking -0.928*** -1.516*** -1.588** 
(0.270) (0.429) (0.539)   
Household in Poverty 0.665*** 0.806* 1.332*  
(0.191) (0.389) (0.578)   
Persons in Household -0.443*** -0.0827 -0.142   
(0.103) (0.168) (0.190)   
Fraction HH Male -0.760** -1.535** -2.703** 
(0.243) (0.569) (0.930)   
Proportion HH Children -0.710 -1.600 -2.473*  
(0.509) (0.942) (1.196)   
Proportion HH Foreign Born 0.357 0.254 -1.353   
(0.362) (0.553) (0.743)   
Proportion Age 65 or Older 0.265 0.483 0.360   
(0.247) (0.620) (1.122)   
Year Structure Built -0.00397 0.00334 0.00571   
(0.00556) (0.0109) (0.0166)   
In Central City 0.847*** 1.522**                
(0.230) (0.489)                
Public Transportation Available 0.820** 0.755 1.458   
(0.272) (0.868) (1.076)   
Constant -5.107 -6.279 -8.690   
(515.2) (21.34) (32.20)   
Percent Change in Odds -61 -78 -77
N 738 176 135   
   N(No Vehicles) 380 119 101
   N(Bundled Parking) 588 101 68
Pseudo R-sq 0.24 0.19 0.24
               
Log-Likelihood -388.9 -89.72 -103580.9
Notes: Dependent variable coded 1 if household has no vehicles.
First regression is for all public housing units, second is restricted to
public housing units in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia
MSAs, and third to New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia cities.
First regression has MSA fixed effects and probability weights.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 10:  Associations with having zero vehicles, public housing households, 2003
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5 Conclusion
This article suggests that bundled parking strongly predicts vehicle ownership, both across the nation 
and within six large MSAs. It further shows a strong albeit less stable association between bundled park-
ing and vehicle owners’ decisions to drive to work. These associations persist in the face of demographic 
and land-use controls and are robust to a variety of tests for residential self-selection. To be clear, with 
cross-sectional data no approach perfectly controls for self-selection. But five different approaches to 
controlling for it yield consistent results, all of which suggest a statistically and economically significant 
impact of bundled parking on vehicle ownership. In general, the estimates suggest that households with 
bundled parking are 60 to 80 percent less likely to be vehicle-free than households with bundled park-
ing. 
In sum, there is reason to believe that bundled parking causes additional vehicle ownership; at the 
margin, hiding the cost of parking in the price of housing leads more people to own vehicles. The results 
suggest that reducing or eliminating minimum parking requirements—which will likely reduce the 
incidence of bundled parking—will also reduce vehicle ownership and by extension vehicle use. 
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Table A-1: First Stage Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2
Household Income ($1,000s) 0.0003369*** .0003095***
(0.0000698) (.0000815)
Central City -0.0727151*** -.0703665***
(0.0085748) (.0086189)
Proportion HH w/BA or Higher -0.0119017 -.0086466
(0.0109514) (.0128877)
Proportion HH Male 0.0204677 -.0255565
(0.0172311) (.0138412)
Proportion HH Children 0.0150427 .004441
(0.0113932) (.0203186)
Proportion HH Foreign Born -0.0044489 .0259945*
(0.0109215) (.010718)
Proportion HH Black 0.0242822 .0042374
(0.0131675) (.0127991)
Proportion HH Age 65 or More 0.0025862*** .0419932**
(0.0001945) (.0185519)
Year Structure Built 0.0363061*** .0024947***
(0.0086074) (.0002497)
Public Transit Available -0.0174172 .0001048
(0.0131272) (.0107338)
Unit Within 1/2 Block of:
     Parking Lots 0.0175826 .017211
(0.0094358) (.0096091)
     High-Rise Apartment Buildings -0.0153615 -.0316299
(0.0158531) (.0243429)
     Apartments <4 Stories -0.0051336 .0001935
(0.013719) (.0181897)
     Town Houses and Row Houses -0.0355965*** -.0339256***
(0.008853) (.009623)
     Single Family Homes 0.0610693*** .0458768***
(0.0090461) (.0108822)
     Parks 0.0175826 .0047298
(0.0094358) (.0102007)
     Apartments 4-6 Stories -0.0632542*** -.0439366***
(0.011282) (.015747)
     Industrial Buildings -0.0165487 -.0372146
(0.0166587) (.0217512)
     Abandoned Buildings -0.1099102*** -.082464***
(0.015544) (.0241417)
     Shops and Businesses -0.0308997*** -.0261289***
(0.0085297) (.0090338)
Share  MSA Housing with Bundled Parking 0.9825385*** .9209963***
(0.1005087) (.1473555)






* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Unit has Bundled Parking
Appendix:  First stage regression results
The IV estimates account for the potential endogeneity between bundled parking and vehicle owner-
ship. The two instruments are the share of housing units in an MSA that have bundled parking and the 
share of housing units built before 1920. As discussed in the text, these two variables are highly collinear, 
and the only advantage to including both is to permit post-estimation tests of instrument validity. The 
first-stage regression results show that when both are included in the first-stage model, only the parking 
instrument is large and statistically significant. However, if the regression is run with only one instru-
ment (regardless of which one), that instrument is large and statistically significant. As discussed in the 
text, using only one instrument does not change the second-stage results substantially.
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Table A-1: First Stage Regression Results (continued)
